El Estado es un concepto clave en la filosofía jurídico-política de José Ortega y Gasset (Madrid, 1883-1955). Sin embargo, resulta sorprendente que, pese a la importancia que para este autor tenía dicha noción, no haya sido estudiada con la misma profundidad e interés que otras vertientes de su pensamiento. A este respecto, basta repasar las monografías y los artículos publicados hasta la fecha sobre la figura y la obra de Ortega para constatar que, en términos cuantitativos, las investigaciones (...) dedicadas a la idea orteguiana del Estado han sido apenas testimoniales, y desde luego no son tan significativas como las que se han podido dedicar a otros temas o tópicos más conocidos de su pensamiento. Así pues, el presente libro pretende abordar el estudio de la realidad problemática del Estado en su triple dimensión histórica, sociológica y política. De acuerdo con tal propósito, esta monografía se divide en tres partes: en la primera de ellas, se estudian las instituciones políticas de Roma entendidas por Ortega como precedentes ineludibles para la formación histórica del Estado. La segunda parte de la obra versa sobre el Estado concebido como culminación de lo social, es decir, como órgano diferenciado para el ejercicio del poder público, lo cual conduce indefectiblemente hasta la Teoría de los usos sociales. Por último, la tercera parte se centra en el concepto orteguiano de Estado como forma de organización política, explica la relación que mantienen el Estado y nación en su obra, y expone las líneas principales del programa político pensado por Ortega para modernizar, regenerar y europeizar a España. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo realiza una genealogía del concepto de animal-hombre en el campo de la filosofía de la técnica y ésta misma como prótesis o extensión del cuerpo humano, desde Oswald Spengler y José Ortega y Gasset hasta Arnold Gehlen y Marshall McLuhan. A la vez, en cuanto esta definición zoológica del ser humano supone una antropodicea técnica y tecnológica, analiza las transformaciones del mundo que produce y del mismo sujeto involucrado en este proceso. Con lo cual los fenómenos (...) biotecnológicos de la modernidad tardía se muestran como un horizonte extremadamente problemático y ya no deducibles del léxico protésico. Abstract: This article carries out a genealogy of the concept of animal-man in the field of the philosophy of technique and technique itself as a prosthesis or extension of the human body, from Oswald Spengler and José Ortega y Gasset to Arnold Gehlen and Marshall McLuhan. At the same time, since this zoological definition of the human being supposes a technical and technological anthropodicey, it analyzes the transformations of the world that it produces and of the same subject involved in this process. With which the biotechnological phenomena of late modernity are shown as an extremely problematic horizon and no longer deductible from the prosthetic lexicon. (shrink)

Nocebo effects occur when an individual experiences undesirable physiological reactions caused by doxastic states that are not a treatment’s core or characteristic features.1 As Scott Gelfand2 points out, there are numerous studies that have shown that the disclosure of a treatment’s side effects to a patient increases the risk of the side effects. From an ethical point of view, nocebo effects caused by the disclosures of side effects present a challenging problem. On the one hand, clinicians’ duty to inform patients (...) of the consequences (including possible side effects) of their treatments is critical in ensuring that patients’ autonomy is respected. Patients cannot act autonomously if relevant information is withheld from them (without their consent, perhaps). On the other hand, clinicians also ought to minimize harm to patients. (shrink)

We are dealing with the Dirac Hamiltonian H = H0 + V with no magnetic field and radially symmetric electrostatic potential V = V(r), preferably the Coulomb potential. While the observable H is precisely predictable, its components H0 (relativistic mass) and V (potential energy) are not. However they both possess precisely predictable approximations H0 ∼ and V∼ which approximate accurately if the particle is not near its nucleus. On the other hand, near 0, H0 and V are practically unpredictable, perhaps (...) in agreement with the fact, that a neutrino also should be in the game. [We have not yet studied the corresponding observables for the (≥ 12-dimensional) problem of electro-weak interaction.] Mathematically we are focusing on the spectral theory of the unbounded self-adjoint operators H0 ∼ and V ∼. We can prove that V ∼ is unitarily equivalent to V(r) again, by a unitary map given as Wiener-Hopf-type singular integral operator in the standard separation of variables for radially symmetric Dirac Hamiltonians. [This is, as far as the continuous spectrum is concerned.] Very similar unitary equivalence holds for H 0 ∼ and H 0. We are tempted to regard this as a form of “renormalization”. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Rhees seems unaware that Simone Weil differed from him both in her conception of philosophy and of its relation to religion. She differed also in her view of the relation between religion and science. On her view, the aim of science is to find the laws which will allow us to apply deductive reasoning to nature. The necessities revealed had for her a religious significance. But this can be understood only given her view of the relation between God and the (...) world. On her view, the creation of the world did not involve an extension of God's power. It involved a withdrawal of his power, so that there could be an existence independent of himself. God does not interfere in the details of the world but sustains it through a network of necessities. For this reason, these necessities can serve as a sign of God. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

The first part of this paper deals with Mill’s influential criticism of the natural law tradition. According to Mill, this tradition is based on a mistaken conception of nature. This essay argues that Mill’s own view of nature is misconceived and that this misconception leads him to misrepresent the tradition itself. The second part deals with those modern philosophers who reject the natural law tradition but who nevertheless attempt to account for morality as being based on human nature. Certain criticisms (...) are made of their views. The chief criticism is that their views are based on an idea of nature that is no different from Mill’s. (shrink)

Metaphysics -- Bacon -- Locke -- Kant -- Comte -- Logical positivism -- Russell -- Analysis -- Quine and science -- Wittgenstein.

In recent times Wittgenstein's work in logic has had an influence on other branches of philosophy. I am thinking, in particular, of social philosophy and the philosophy of religion. In these branches, Wittgenstein's followers have made much use of his notion of a language game. It has been argued, for example, that religion forms a language game of its own, having its own standards of reason, and is therefore not subject to criticism from outside. This argument has given rise to (...) controversy, some seeing it as a subtle attempt by the religious to evade criticism. I have come myself to feel that the notion of a language game has been put to uses with which Wittgenstein himself might not have agreed, or, if he had, would have been wrong to do so. In order to explain what I mean I should like to look closely at the opening section of Peter Winch's article ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’. (shrink)

Hume is not a philosopher who has been viewed, on the whole, with excessive sympathy. Slips and inadequacies of argument, which are the inevitable consequence of human fallibility, are treated by his critics not with charity but with delight; and there are few who think it necessary to state his argument at its strongest before proceeding to refute it. A striking example of this procedure may be found in Antony Flew's paper ‘Another Idea of Necessary Connection’. The example is striking (...) because Flew is normally one of the most sympathetic of Hume's critics and he might have been expected, in dealing with Humes view of causal necessity, to have proceeded with exceptional fairness, the incidental being identified and discarded and the essential view standing forth at its strongest. This, as I shall show, is not what occurs; but first let us consider what we are to take the essential view to be. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

This title was first published in 2001: Tolstoy's view of art is discussed in most courses in aesthetics, particularly his main text What is Art? He believed that the importance of art lies not in its purely aesthetic qualities but in its connection with life, and that art becomes decadent where this connection is lost. This view has often been misconceived and its strength overlooked. This book presents a clear exposition of Tolstoy's What is Art?, highlighting the value and importance (...) of Tolstoy's views in relation to aesthetics. Mounce considers the problems which exercised Tolstoy and explains their fundamental importance in contemporary disputes. Having viewed these problems of aesthetics as they arise in a classic work, Howard Mounce affords readers fresh insights not simply into the problems of aesthetics themselves, but also into their contemporary treatment. Students and interested readers of aesthetics and philosophy, as well as those exploring the works of Tolstoy in literature, will find this book of particular interest and will discover that reading What is Art? with attention, affords something of the excitement found in removing the grime from an oil painting - gradually from underneath there appears an authentic masterpiece. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in the Tractatus presupposes that thought may be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. It is commonly held, however, that in the Tractatus he treated thought as logically prior to language. If this view, expressed most lucidly by Norman Malcolm, were correct, Wittgenstein would be inconsistent in holding that thought can be revealed without remainder in the use of signs. I argue that this is not correct. Thought may be prior to language in time (...) but not in logic, for non-verbal symbols must have a logical structure in common with verbal ones. A view comparable with Malcolm's holds that Wittgenstein, under the influence of Schopenhauer, is committed to some form of solipsism. I argue that neither Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein held any version of solipsism. For both philosophers, subject and object are correlative, so that it is incoherent to affirm the existence of the one without presupposing the existence of the other. (shrink)

Sophie Botros's criticism of my review depends in part on certain misprints which appear in the review as printed. In particular, words are omitted from my summary of her position. What I wrote was as follows.